When a bank suffers a cyberattack, its customers care more about the intrusion’s technical details than about the bank. Is their money safe? Has their personal information been exposed? And what should they do to protect themselves?
In Nigeria, the answers depend partly on what happened and partly on who needs to be informed. Reporting an incident to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is not the same as notifying affected customers. Neither automatically requires a public announcement. But when a breach of personal data is likely to create a high risk to individuals, the law requires banks to tell those affected.
The distinction has become increasingly important as financial institutions face attacks that can expose customer information, disrupt services or compromise funds. It also raises a difficult question for regulators: how can banks be compelled to disclose incidents without turning every announcement into a threat to public confidence?
CBN figures show that Nigerian banks and their customers lost ₦134.48 billion ($100.09 million) to fraud between 2020 and 2025. The figures cover financial losses suffered by victims, not necessarily money that disappeared from the banking system, and do not distinguish cyberattacks on bank infrastructure from other forms of fraud. More recent data from the Nigerian Interbank Settlement System shows that payment fraud losses fell to ₦25.85 billion ($19.24 million) in 2025, from ₦52.26 billion ($38.90 million) the previous year.
The figures do not reveal how many cyber incidents occurred or how often customers were left unaware of compromised information. But they point to the stakes in a financial system where trust is essential to everyday transactions.
Regulators aren’t customers
Under the CBN’s 2024 Risk-Based Cybersecurity Framework, deposit money banks and payment service banks must report security incidents to the Director of Banking Supervision within 24 hours. The requirement allows the regulator to assess threats, monitor institutions, and coordinate responses. It is not a blanket instruction to announce every incident publicly.
“Banks are disclosing attacks currently to regulators, and if any bank fails to, they face sanctions from regulators,” said Festus Amede, chairman of the Committee of Chief Information Security Officers of Nigerian Financial Institutions. He did not say whether any banks have been sanctioned before for not disclosing attacks.
But a regulator and a customer need different information. The CBN may need technical details about the cyberattack, the systems affected, and the bank’s response. Customers need to know whether their accounts or personal information are at risk, and what steps they should take.
A bank can therefore report an incident to the CBN without issuing a public statement. Equally, fulfilling that supervisory obligation does not necessarily satisfy a separate duty to notify customers whose personal data has been exposed.
That second obligation comes under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023. Section 40 requires a data controller to notify the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC) within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach likely to pose a risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms. Where the breach is likely to create a high risk, affected individuals must also be notified immediately.
The distinction matters. Not every attempted intrusion exposes personal information, and not every data breach carries the same level of risk. The NDPC’s guidance identifies potential fraud, identity theft, and exposure of sensitive personal data as indicators of high risk. The assessment depends on the information involved and the likely consequences, not simply whether an incident is described as a cyberattack.
Disclosure versus panic
For banks, the challenge is deciding how to communicate while an investigation is still under way. Disclosing too little can leave customers exposed. Saying too much, too soon, can create confusion or undermine confidence before the institution has established what happened.
Gbenga Sesan, executive director of Paradigm Initiative, a pan-African organisation focused on digital inclusion and rights, argues that banks should not use the risk of panic as a reason to withhold information. They should first ensure that an incident is contained or being addressed, then explain what happened and what they are doing about it.
“They need to manage the balance between panic and disclosure,” he told TechCabal.
That balance becomes especially important when personal information is involved. A customer whose account balance remains untouched may still face risks if an attacker has obtained a phone number, email address, or other information that could be used for impersonation or phishing.
“The affected individuals need to be notified, with the bank stating which data was compromised and at the same time confirming what actions have been and will be taken,” Sesan said.
The law requires notifications to explain the likely consequences of a breach, the measures taken or proposed to address it, and how affected individuals can obtain further information. A generic assurance that customers’ funds are safe may therefore be inadequate if their personal information has been exposed.
Iyinoluwa Aboyeji, general partner and co-founder of Future Africa, sees a different danger. In a sector where confidence can determine whether customers leave their money in a bank, he worries that public disclosure could trigger withdrawals and deepen the damage caused by a cyberattack.
“Right now there is no upside except a run on the bank,” he said.
Aboyeji argues that banks should put greater emphasis on prevention and recovery, including cyber insurance that can help institutions manage the financial consequences of a cyberattack. He also warns that a system focused too heavily on punishment could discourage banks from reporting incidents.
“Punishment will make it less likely they disclose a cyberattack, not more likely,” he said.
His argument exposes a tension in the debate. Banks need incentives to report attacks promptly, but customers also need protection from institutions that might prefer to preserve their reputations rather than disclose a breach. The answer cannot be to make transparency optional. Nor should every incident, regardless of its nature or consequences, be treated as evidence of institutional failure.
The distinction regulators must make is between a bank that reports an incident, contains the threat and meets its obligations, and one that neglects basic security measures or withholds information it is legally required to provide.
Customers’ information rights
Recent incidents illustrate why the nature of a cyberattack matters. In August 2026, Zenith Bank told customers that attackers had accessed limited contact information, including email addresses and phone numbers. The bank said its core banking systems and digital channels remained secure.
In November 2026, Lendsqr disclosed attempted cyberattacks, but its chief executive, Adedeji Olowe, said the company’s defences held and no funds, customer data or accounts were compromised. Cryptocurrency platform Patricia disclosed a security breach involving Bitcoin and naira assets in 2023. Subsequent reports dated the incident to January 2022 and estimated the losses at about $2 million.
These cases are not interchangeable. An attempted cyberattack, an exposure of customer information, and a successful theft carry different consequences and may trigger different obligations. A bank can experience a serious security incident without customer data being compromised. Conversely, the absence of stolen funds does not mean customers have no reason to be concerned.
For Sesan, the problem extends beyond whether banks send notifications within the required deadlines. Regulators must establish whether institutions are identifying incidents accurately and acting on what they discover. Banks maintain internal security records, he said, which can help supervisors assess whether incidents were detected and reported.
“The notification is only a part of the measures taken to ensure transparency and ensure that action follows,” he said.
He argued that the effectiveness of the rules ultimately depends on enforcement. “The framework is only as strong as its implementation, and the latter is where we lack.”
That leaves regulators with a responsibility that extends beyond receiving reports. They must verify compliance, require corrective action, and make clear when institutions have failed to meet their obligations. Public reporting on the number and nature of incidents, compliance failures, and enforcement measures could improve accountability without exposing sensitive technical details or compromising investigations.
For customers, the practical test is simpler. They need to know whether their money or personal information is at risk, what the bank has done to contain the incident, and what steps they should take. They also need accessible support and updates if the investigation changes what is known about the breach.
The aim should not be to make every cyberattack a public spectacle. It should be to ensure that banks cannot use the fear of panic to avoid telling customers what they need to know. In a financial system built on trust, silence may protect a bank’s reputation in the short term. It can also leave the people who depend on it carrying risks they were never given the chance to manage.
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