State police: Are our fears greater than expected benefits?

The debate over state police in Nigeria is one of the most contentious issues confronting the Nigerian federal system and its security architecture. Across the length and breadth of Nigeria, insecurity continues to manifest in the forms of kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, communal violence, armed robbery and farmer-herder conflicts. Thus, the effectiveness of a highly centralised policing system in Nigeria has come under increasing scrutiny. The subject matter is simply not whether Nigeria needs more police officers, but whether policing should exclusively remain under federal control or be constitutionally decentralised to allow states to establish their own police forces. Proponents of state police argue that security challenges are local in character and require responsive institutions at the same level. Critics, however, fear that state governors could weaponise the police forces against political opponents, ethnic minorities and vulnerable communities. These concerns are particularly significant in a country with a history of military rule, electoral violence, institutional weakness and political interference in law enforcement assignments. The fundamental question, therefore, is whether the potential dangers of state police outweigh its benefits. This article argues that state police could significantly improve security, intelligence gathering, and police accountability in Nigeria, with the caveat that the state police architecture must be accompanied by constitutional safeguards, independent oversight, professional standards, and enforceable protections for human rights. The fear of abuse is legitimate, but it should inform the design of state policing rather than automatically prevent its adoption and establishment.

In context, Nigeria operates a centralised police system under the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, establishes a single police force for the federation and prohibits the creation of another police force for Nigeria or any part of it, subject to the constitutional framework. This arrangement reflects a longstanding preference for uniform law enforcement nationwide. Historically, centralised policing was intended to preserve national cohesion, prevent regional security fragmentation, and limit the use of local security forces by powerful political actors. However, Nigeria’s evolving security environment raises concerns about whether a single national command structure can respond adequately to the country’s geographical size, population, diversity and varying security threats. A security problem in Borno State may involve insurgency and terrorism; one in Zamfara may involve armed banditry and kidnapping; a community in Benue may face persistent communal violence; and urban centres such as Lagos may confront organised robbery, cyber-enabled crime, and complex metropolitan security challenges. Although these threats sometimes criss-cross state boundaries, their immediate causes, intelligence requirements, and community dynamics often differ. These challenges are not necessarily proof that centralisation itself has absolutely failed, but they demonstrate the need to reconsider how policing responsibilities are distributed.

The fear surrounding state police in Nigeria is largely imaginary, though it is supported by political and institutional risks. It arises from the country’s political history, institutional weaknesses, and the possibility that those entrusted with protecting citizens may become instruments of political domination. The most prominent concern is that governors may use state police to consolidate political power. A governor with effective control over recruitment, deployment, promotions, and disciplinary procedures could potentially direct officers against political opponents, journalists, protesters, or critics. In states where political competition is intense, state police might be used to obstruct opposition rallies, intimidate electoral opponents, or enforce politically motivated restrictions. This would undermine the democratic principles that policing is supposed to protect. Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversity presents another challenge. A state police force dominated by one ethnic, religious, or political group could discriminate against minorities or communities perceived as outsiders. Not all Nigerian states possess the same financial resources or administrative capabilities. Wealthier states might establish well-equipped police services with modern technology, competitive salaries, and specialised investigative units. Poorer states could struggle to provide basic equipment, maintain vehicles, or pay personnel consistently. This could create a two-tier security system in which citizens’ access to effective protection depends on where they live. The coexistence of federal and state police could generate disputes over authority, investigations, intelligence sharing, and command responsibility. Criminal organisations frequently operate across state boundaries, and poorly coordinated police forces might struggle to pursue suspects beyond their jurisdictions. If responsibilities are not clearly defined, criminals could exploit institutional rivalry while governments blame one another for security failures. Decentralisation does not automatically produce professionalism. If state police inherit inadequate training, weak internal discipline and poor public accountability, Nigeria may simply multiply the number of institutions capable of violating citizens’ rights. The central lesson is that changing the location of police command is not the same as transforming policing culture.

The answer to the question, “Is Our Fear Greater Than the Expected Benefits?” depends on whether Nigeria treats state police as a political project or as a constitutional and institutional reform. Fear should not be dismissed, but neither should it become a permanent justification for maintaining the existing centralised policing system that may be insufficiently responsive to local security needs. Nigeria’s reform debate has reached a significant stage. In June 2026, the National Assembly advanced constitutional amendments to enable state police, and the bill was subsequently transmitted to state legislatures. However, as of October 15, 2026, only five of the 36 State Houses of Assembly had reportedly approved it, falling short of the 24-state threshold required for constitutional alteration. State police therefore remained a proposed reform rather than an operational constitutional arrangement at that point. This situation presents an opportunity to address the legitimate fears before implementation.

The following measures are essential: State police must operate under clearly defined legal powers, with explicit prohibitions against partisan policing, unlawful detention, discrimination, and the suppression of peaceful political activity; every state should establish a police complaints authority with investigative independence, civilian representation, adequate funding, and the power to recommend or initiate enforceable disciplinary and legal action; recruitment should be merit-based, transparent, and subject to background checks. Officers should receive training in human rights, conflict resolution, intelligence gathering, criminal investigation, and the proportionate use of force; state police chiefs should have secured and legally defined tenures. Transfers, promotions, and disciplinary decisions should follow transparent procedures rather than governors’ personal preferences; states should publish police budgets, expenditure reports, procurement records, and performance assessments. Federal equalisation support could help poorer states meet minimum national standards without creating permanent dependence or compromising operational accountability.

Related News

Federal police should retain defined national responsibilities, including cross-state investigations, terrorism, transnational organised crime and national intelligence coordination. Protocols must govern joint operations, evidence sharing, arrests across state boundaries and disputes over jurisdiction. Also, courts must remain accessible to victims of police abuse, while state legislatures should conduct regular public hearings and scrutinise police performance. Independent investigations should be mandatory where serious allegations involve senior officers or political office-holders. The state police should be introduced through phased implementation, with measurable indicators covering response times, crime clearance, public trust, complaints of abuse and protection of vulnerable groups. Independent evaluations should determine whether the model is improving security before expansion or restructuring.

Our fear could be greater than our willingness to tolerate abuse, but it should not be greater than our determination to reform policing. The appropriate response is neither blind enthusiasm nor indefinite resistance. It is to design institutions that make effective policing possible while making political abuse difficult and punishable. Nigeria should therefore approach state police as a constitutional reform whose success depends on implementation quality. If properly designed, state police could bring law enforcement closer to the people, improve intelligence gathering, strengthen emergency response, and increase public confidence. If poorly designed, it could reproduce the weaknesses of the existing system while multiplying the centres of political interference. The real fear is not whether state police carries risks. Every system of policing carries risks. The more important benefit is the need for Nigeria to build a decentralised policing system in which the protection of citizens, rather than the preservation of political power, remains the primary objective.

Dr Lamidi is an Associate Professor in the Department of Local Government and Development Studies and the Vice-Dean, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State

Source:

Punch Newspapers – Latest News